Introduction
System identi cation can be understood as the set of procedures which model an investigated part of reality (called object, process, plant or system) using data measured on it 8]. Modelling of the reality, often informal, is a necessary prerequisite to any prediction and/or control.
The theoretically ideal situation is that we are able to describe the objest so that the necessary simpli cations have negligible in uence on the quality of the decisions made. Such an ideal description is later referred to as a true model.
The Bayesian approach to system identi cation { shortly, Bayesian identi cation 4] { is a plausible and internally consistent paradigm. Its ability to provide consistent statements after any nite information processing is its main advantage. Seemingly, this advantage is paid by the unrealistic assumption that the unknown true model belongs to the set of the candidates considered. Under this assumption, the probability distribution constructed on this set is deductively modi ed by measured data. It concentrates asymptotically on the true model if the data are informative enough. But, what is the relevance of this approach when the true model is beyond the set of its candidates?
There are de nite asymptotic answers as to how the Bayesian identi cation behaves under some mismodelling situations, e.g. 2] . A conceptually clean understanding of its nite-time meaning is, however, lacking. This paper tries to ll this interpretation gap which is important for \beauty" of the Bayesian paradigm. The eligible answer is also of a practical signi cance. For instance, estimation of the control period 1] relies heavily on appropriate understanding of the problem.
To sum up, the paper answers the question: What is the outcome of the Bayesian identi cation without supposing the true system model belongs into the set of considered model candidates?
2 From decision-making to probability This section explains the term \true system description" from a perspective of a wide set of decision tasks. It allows us also to introduce basic notions.
Assume we make decisions d 2 d using the knowledge k 2 k so that a realvalued non-negative loss functionL of d and of an uncertain entity ! 2 ! is \small".
The notion \uncertain" means that the true value of the entity cannot be used for the considered decision making. Thus, a decision rule R : k ! d ; R 2 R , is searched for to \minimize" the loss function L(R(k); !) L (d; !) 2 0; 1].
Note: linguistic distinction of the terms uncertain and unknown is left out of our considerations, which cover them equally at operational level the available knowledge k is xed and known at the decision time and so it is further suppressed in the notation x denotes generically a set of values of x.
The presence of the uncertain entity ! implies that the losses L(R; !) cannot be completely ordered for di erent rules R. Their point-wise comparison provides a partial ordering:
De nition 2.1 Let L Ri (!) L(R i ; !); ! 2 ! , be the losses assigned to a pair of competitive rules R i ; i = 1; 2. The loss L R1 is said to be preferable to the L R2 ,
The loss L R1 is said to be strictly preferable to L R2 if (1) holds and a \rich" set o ! exists on which the inequality (1) is strict.
The rule R 1 is said to be preferable to the R 2 , R 1 R 2 , i L R1 L R2 . R 1 is said to be strictly preferable to the R 2 , R 1 R 2 , i L R1 L R2 .
The rule R 2 R is said to be admissible if there is no rule in R that is strictly preferable to it. Otherwise, it is said to be inadmissible. The term \rich" can be made more precise after describing the structure of the involved elements in detail. We leave it vague for the time being.
Undoubtedly, inadmissible strategies should be avoided. Their performance, judged according to L, is always worse than that of admissible ones. The partial preference ordering of strategies has to be completed in order to choose a good admissible strategy R in a systematic way. The following property helps us in the completion.
De nition 2.2 A complete ordering on the space R , admitting both strict inequality and inequality types of ordering, is said to be strictly isotonic with the partial ordering i R 1 R 2 ) R 1 R 2 and R 1 R 2 ) R 1 < R 2 . Proposition 2.1 Let the set (R ; ) have a smallest element R 0 and is strictly isotonic with respect to . Then, R 0 is admissible.
Proof: By contradiction, let R 2 R be strictly preferable to R 0 . Thus, L R (!) L R0 (!) on ! and this inequality becomes strict on a rich o ! . This inequality, strict isotonicity of and de nition of the smallest element imply the contradictory inequality R < R 0 R.
2.
The partial ordering of decision rules is de ned using ordering of the associated loss functions. Under general topologic conditions 5], the complete strictly isotonic ordering exists. It can be interpreted as the ordering induced by \expected" losses EfL R1 g EfL R2 g , R 1 R 2 :
The \expectation" functional EfL R g 2 0; 1] \removes" the uncertain factor !, i.e. the value EfL R g depends on R only. This complete ordering on R will be denoted E in order to stress its connection to the functional E.
The smallest element R 0 with respect to E will be found (a posteriori) the better, the more the \expectation" E grasps the objective properties of the uncertain factor !. Such \objective expectation" should not depend on the set of strategies R in which the optimum is searched for. 
This technical proposition speci es conditions under which the \expected" loss becomes the ordinary expectation of the utility function U. U is able to express decision-maker's attitude (he is risk aware or prone or indi erent). The measure is universal with respect to a rich class of decision tasks facing the same uncertainty. The assumptions (i), (iii) are technical and widely acceptable (loosely speaking, a small change in the loss should not lead to a substantial change of its expected value). The additivity on loss functions with disjunct supports is the most questionable restriction. This assumption which is much weaker than the general additivity or even linearity is, however, intuitively acceptable if the the functions L 1 ; L 2 are interpreted as a single loss decomposed to its restrictions on a subset of ! and its complement, respectively.
In the risk-indi erent case, U(L(!); !) = L(!), the expectation (2) is isotonic if the measure is non-negative. To achieve strict isotonicity, has to be positive on ! almost everywhere if the rich set o in De nition 2.1 is speci ed as a set of non-zero Lebesgue measure. Then the expectation reduces to the standard one if the preservation of constant Ls is demanded, i.e. (! ) = 1.
For simplicity, the involved measure is supposed to have a Radon-Nikodym derivative f(!) with respect to Lebesgue measure. Thus, the complete strictly isotonous ordering is induced by expected utility R ! U(L(!); !) f(!) d!. The derivative f(!) has all properties of a probability density function (pdf) and the operational equivalence uncertain random becomes relevant.
Note that f(!) has been constructed with a strategy xed. Thus, it generally depends on it, i.e. f(!) f R (!). Particularly, this dependence distinguishes control as a special decision task.
To summarize, quite general conditions have been found under which decision tasks involving uncertainty require description of the involved uncertainties ! in probabilistic terms. Practically, the symbol ! may represent both random elements (e.g. measurement noise) and unknown constants (e.g. system gain). Here, both types of uncertainty are uni ed and treated as random variables. This treatment of constants (their randomization) forms basis of the Bayesian statistics. There are alternative and better justi cations of the Bayesian paradigm, e.g. 4, 5] . We have, however, arrived at a pdf which corresponds to a rich class of decision problems and as such it can be called an objective (true) pdf.
Bayesian identi cation
In the complex problems met in automatic control and signal processing, the pdf describing uncertain quantities is constructed from simpler elements by standard procedures called estimation, ltering and prediction. Let us recall them here. They serve us as a starting point in presenting our main result.
Let ! = (u(t) = (u 1 ; : : : ; u t ); y(t) = (y 1 ; : : : ; y t )) be formed by input and output sequences fed into and observed on a controlled system up to some horizon t. Their relationship is uncertain (incompletely known/random) and as such it is described by the pdf f R (!) f R (u(t); y(t)) Let us consider the usual case that P u = u( ? 1); y( ?1); prior knowledge] is used when choosing u . Thus, the strategy (sequence of decision rules) or control law becomes R = R(t) fR : P u ! u g t .
The chain rule for pdfs implies
The conditional pdf f R (u jP u ) determines probability of generating u when the past P u has been observed. These pdfs describe (randomized) control law i.e. R(t) ff R (u jP u )g t . They re ect (possibly random) rules of input selection.
They are the main outcome of the supported optimization.
The conditional pdf f R (y ju ; P u ), describes probability of observing y when u is applied and the past P u observed. These pdfs describe the (random) response of the controlled system. They represent the system model S(t) ff R (y ju ; P u )g t needed for the optimal control design that minimizes expected loss. Often, S(t) depends on R(t) through the applied inputs only.
The considered learning systems construct models of reality indirectly by identifying a so called parametrized system model given by pdfs f R (y ju ; P u ; ). The additional variable 2 \points" to alternative models. It is interpreted as an unknown (multivariate) parameter and has a very general structure 7]. The term unknown means that is not a part of the knowledge available to control strategy, i.e. so called natural conditions of control 4] are ful lled f R (u jP u ; ) = f R (u jP u ).
These pdfs specify parametrized description of the interconnection controller-system f R (u(t); y(t)j ) = t Y =1 f R (u jP u )f R (y ju ; P u ; ) through the chain rule.
Traditionally, it is supposed that a \true" parameter T exists in the considered set of possible values, i.e. the \objective" pdf f R (!) discussed in previous section coincides with f R (u(t); y(t)j T ). Then, a subjective prior pdf f( ) > 0 is selected on . It distributes (subjective) belief that particular values of coincide with T . This prior pdf is corrected by the observed data. The resulting pdf is used for prediction, or, for construction of the system model needed for control design. The probabilistic rules employed are summarized in Proposition 3.1 The Bayesian parameter estimate (in a wide sense), i.e. the posterior pdf of the unknown , evolves according to the formula f( jP ut+1 ) / f R (y t ju t ; P ut ; )f( jP ut ) (3) with f( jP u1 ) f( ). The symbol / means proportionality up to a factor independent of . The Bayesian prediction (in a wide sense), i.e. the predictive pdf (system model with the excluded parameter) is given by the formula f R (y t ju t ; P ut ) = Z f R (y t ju t ; P ut ; )f( jP ut ) d
These formulae are valid under natural conditions of control 4]. Proof: In fact, the unknown parameter completes the colection of uncertain quantities to ! = (u(t); y(t); ). The corresponding joint pdf is a product of \objective" and subjective factors: f R (u(t); y(t); ) = f R (u(t); y(t)j )f( ): Both the estimation and prediction just evaluate marginal/conditional pdfs and insert measured data. For details, see 4].
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The formula (3) implies that zero prior belief keeps the posterior one at zero, irrespectively of data. Thus, we cannot learn of not assumed a priori as a possible \true" parameter.
At the same time we know that, at least due to the complexity of the Nature, the \true" parameter is out of any tractable set . Thus, the natural question addressed in the paper arises: what we are doing when we apply Bayesian paradigm and at the same time face this situation?
Bayesian paradigm revised
Recall: a set of decision tasks is considered and parametrized models specifying f R (u(t); y(t)j ), 2 are selected. The triple (u(t); y(t); ) can be complemented by all relevant (unmodelled) in uences, say g(t), to the full quadruple ! g = (u(t); y(t); ; g(t)) of uncertain entities in the problem. The completness means that an objective probabilistic measure (d! g ) characterized in Proposition 2.3 exists. For simplicity, the factor g(t) representing mismodelling is assumed not to prevent us from characterizing by the pdf f T (! g ).
Obviously, the inspected losses do not depend on the unmodelled factor g(t)
(we do not know how to quantify it so that we cannot include it into our loss function). For the same reason, it cannot in uence attitude to the uncertainty risk: U(L(! g ); ! g ) = U(L(!); !); ! = (u(t); y(t); ). This fact together with the formula for expected utility imply that the marginal true pdf f T (!) f T (u(t); y(t); ) = R g (t) f T (!; g(t)) dg(t) is supposed to exist.
The parameter is \man-made", it characterizes models. Its marginal (prior) distribution coincides with prior belief f( ) attached to the possible values 2 .
Thus, the true pdf can be factorized f T (!) f T (u(t); y(t)j )f( ). The arti cial nature of implies that f T (u(t); y(t)j ) = f T (u(t); y(t)), so, it does not depend on . The true pdf of the data, f T (u(t); y(t)) is unknown and need not coincide with any considered model. As a pdf, the chain rule is valid for it. Moreover, the same randomized decision rule f(u jP u ) is imposed both on the true and the model system. Facing mismodelling, the understanding of Bayesian identi cation as the data correction of the prior pdf f( ), interpreted as a belief of the statement = T = true parameter, as described in Proposition 3.1, lacks meaning. Instead, the key shift in the paradigm, proposed here, consists of interpreting the Bayesian identi cation as redistribution of the prior pdf f( ) as the belief of the statement = best = the pointer to the best approximant f(u(t); y(t)j best ) to the unknown pdf f T (u(t); y(t)).
In other words, the answer to the key question of the paper is suggested as follows:
We want to learn the reality (the true system model) but what we really get, using Bayesian identi cation, is information on the best projection of the true model to the considered set of models candidates.
Obviously, under mismodelling we work with a sort of projection but the two questions arise:
What type of projection we are dealing with? Why is the best one learnt? These questions are answered in the next section. Some remarks should be made beforehand. Note:
The inpenetrable barrier between reality and arti cial world of models has remained: the projection error is out of control whenever the set of considered models is xed. It is bad news as no perpetuum mobile was proposed, but it is good news as the importance of modelling is again underlined.
The proposed answer is really a generalization of the case T 2 . In this situation, the best projection coincides with the true data pdf and \classical" Bayesian interpretation remains to be valid.
The result supports the Bayesian identi cation as a tool for constructing the system model as predictor generated by a parametrized model. Use of parametrized models o ers the chance to select a relatively rich set of models to which the true one projected. It opens the possibility of making their distance small.
What projection?
This section singles out the adequate best 2 . The result is motivated by Shannon-McMillan-Breiman theorem 3]. The adopted version minimizes assumptions on the true pdfs and restricts the class of parametrized models to those with nite-dimensional observable state f(y t ju t ; P ut ; ) = m t ( t ):
Here, m t is a known (generally, time-varying) function of a nite-dimensional data vector t (y t ; t ). The \regression" vector t is a known function of t?1 and the observed data u t ; y t?1 . The initial condition 0 is assumed to be known, too. The functions m t are positive on their domains t for all xed 2 and t = 1; 2; : : :
The estimated parameter is supposed to be time-invariant. Thus, all estimators based on u(t); y(t); t = 1; 2; : : : have the common aim, to estimate the same quantity. The estimation of control period is assumed to be the choice of an integer n forming the integer multiplier of the sampling period to which the length 1 is assigned. This means that inputs are kept constant within n consequent control steps and only a single representant of the n-tuple of outputs measured within these steps is used in the feedback.
The idea of the estimation of n follows. Facing the mismodelling and trying to build an approximation of the true pdf f T , the combination of direct two-, threeor more-steps ahead predictors can result in a better approximation of f T than the combination of one-step ahead predictors (which seems to be the best case having no mismodelling at all, i.e. when the true model coincides with any from the set of model candidates). For details, see 1, 7] .
So, together with standard model structure and parameter estimation also the number n representing the chosen n-steps ahead predictor is estimated. Such estimaten is interpreted as the searched control period. Using the just developed interpretation machinery, the simultaneous estimation of n, model structure and parameters themselves is just an e ort to nd out the best projection of the true pdf into the set of pdfs generated by used (`generalized' ARX) models 1]. We can use such estimation procedure anyway but now the result is easy to interpret and well justi ed.
Conclusions
The paper answers the question: What is the outcome of the Bayesian identi cation without supposing the true model belongs into the considered set of model candidates. The answer summarizes in the statement: We try to identify the reality (the true system model) but what we really get, using Bayesian identi cation, is an information on the best projection of the true model to such considered set of model candidates.
The novelty of this statement lies in its validity for any (even nite) information which is processed.
The contribution of the paper to modelling is indirect only. The statement just underlines the well known rule of thumb: use of known facts (physical laws, ability to approximate a rich set of mappings, expert's knowledge etc.) for making a set of candidates to model the reality. Such set will decide on quality of the projection, on mismodelling error.
Similarly, the answer has in fact no computational consequences, but uni es and serves as an interpretation of various previously obtained results in the Bayesian identi cation eld.
In the paper, a mathematical treatment of this idea is presented with two particular results of interest: the meaning of the \true" probabilistic description is clari ed and related to a set of decision tasks asymptotic behaviour of Bayesian estimator is characterized. To sum up, the paper is of a methodological nature. It tries to connect the model to reality more precisely than just saying`model is an approximation of the real object'. It tries to model`mismodelling'. In other words, it speci es the di erence between what we actually get using the once chosen model and what we would get using the true model. The goal of the paper is not to say absolutely that a particular model is good or bad, but, from the set of models given in advance (which, e.g., di er by a value of one parameter of the generic model), tries to nd the relatively best (with respect to this set) model to form the best projection of the true pdf to the corresponding set of model-generated pdfs. Thus, only the models speci ed beforehand are used for comparison.
In this way the Bayesian identi cation procedures used are better justi ed and, hopefully, a space is open for new constructions.
